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JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction for this appeal is conferred upon this Court
by Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Is a release

from

liability and release of claims

contract, which is read, understood and signed by both parties, a
valid and enforceable agreement.

Inasmuch as a challenge to

summary judgment presents for review conclusions of law only,
because, by definition, summary judgments do not resolve factual
issues, the appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without according difference to the trial court's legal
conclusion.
2.

Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989).

Was the trial court's decision to deny appellant's Motion

to Amend Complaint an abuse of its discretion.

A ruling on a

motion to amend is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Absent a clear abuse of that discretion, the appellate court will
not disturb a trial court's ruling on a motion to amend.

Kelly v.

Utah Power & Light, 746 P.2d 1189, 1190 (Utah App. 1987).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a medical malpractice action arising from a right
total knee replacement performed by defendant R. David Beck, M.D.
("Dr. Beck"), with defendant Bruce Hultgren, M.D. ("Dr. Hultgren")
serving as the anesthesiologist, at defendant Holy Cross Hospital
("the Hospital") on May 5, 1987.

Defendant Dr. Hultgren filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
with the trial court claiming that plaintiff's claim against him
was barred by the two year statute of limitations provided in Utah
Code Annotated § 78-14-4, and that plaintiff failed to comply with
Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-12(2).

(R. at 95). The trial court

granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Hultgren on February 20,
1991.

The court found as a matter of law that plaintiff's claims

against Dr. Hultgren were barred by the statute of limitations and
that plaintiff's request for prelitigation review against Dr.
Hultgren was procedurally deficient in that it was not served
within sixty days after the notice of intent to commence action as
required by Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-12(2).

(R. at 309-310).

Defendants Dr. Beck and Holy Cross Hospital filed Motions for
Summary Judgment based on a valid and enforceable Release from
Liability and Release of All Claims contract ("Release") entered
into between plaintiff, Dr. Beck and the Hospital.
153).

(R. at 109 &

The agreement released Dr. Beck and the Hospital from any

and all liability for the knee surgery performed on May 5, 1987,
in exchange for fair and adequate consideration.

The trial court

granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Beck and the Hospital on
March 4, 1991, finding as a matter of law that the agreement was
valid and enforceable and released Dr. Beck and the Hospital from
any and all liability.

(R. at 315-318).

-2-

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend his Complaint on November
12, 1990, which was denied by the trial court in a separate order
on March 4, 1991.

(R. at 215-217, 313-314).
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

On or about May 5, 1987, plaintiff was admitted to Holy

Cross Hospital for a right total knee replacement.
2.

The operation was successfully performed by Dr. Beck,

with Dr. Hultgren serving as the anesthesiologist.
3.

(R. at 116).

During the post-surgery hospitalization plaintiff was on

prolonged bed rest.
4.

(R. at 116).

(R. at 116).

At some time following the surgery plaintiff complained

of tingling and numbness in both arms, which was diagnosed as
bilateral ulnar nerve compression.
5.

Decompression surgery on both arms was recommended by

Dr. Beck for this condition.
6.

(R. at 116).

(R. at 116).

Plaintiff decided that the physicians and the Hospital

were responsible for this condition but iiiiormed Dr. Beck that he
would not sue him, or the Hospital, if Dr. Beck would perform the
decompression surgery free of charge.

(Deposition of Eugene

Andreini, Attached as Exhibit 1, pp. 55-56, R. at 116 & 134).
7.

Although Dr. Beck believed that the ulnar nerve compres-

sion was due to plaintiff's arthritic condition, Dr. Beck agreed
to perform the surgery without charge.

-3-

(R. at 116).

8.

As part of the agreement, Dr. Beck submitted a request

to the Hospital asking them to also donate their services for the
decompression surgery.
9.

The Hospital agreed not to charge plaintiff for his

hospitalization.
10.

(R. at 116).

(R. at 117).

Plaintiff

arrived

Hospital on July 9, 1987.
11.

for surgery and admission to the

(R. at 117).

At this time, plaintiff was presented with a "Release

from Liability and Release of all Claims" form which had been
prepared by the Hospital.

(Attached as Exhibit 2, R. at 117 &

140. )
12.

This form was to be signed by plaintiff before surgery

would proceed and it released the Hospital and Dr. Beck from any
and all liability for the knee surgery of May 5, 1987, in exchange
for fair and adequate consideration.
13.

Plaintiff

initially

(R. at 117).

refused

to

sign

the

Release.

However, after a phone conversation with Dr. Beck, plaintiff signed
the Release and the surgery went ahead as planned.

(Andreini

Deposition, pp. 53-54; R. at 117, 132-133).
14.

Plaintiff asserts that he was angry about having to sign

the Release but acknowledges reading and signing it in the presence
of his mother and a friend.

(Andreini Deposition, pp. 52, 54, 58;

R. at 117, 131, 133, 136).
15.

Plaintiff admitted in his deposition that he was not on

medication when he read the Release, that he discussed signing the
-4-

Release with his mother and a friend, and that he could have gotten
up and left the Hospital rather than have the surgery.

(Andreini

Deposition, pp. 52-54, 58-59; R. at 117, 131-133, 136-137).
16.

Plaintiff also admits that he knew what was in the

Release, realized that Holy Cross was going to waive their charges
in return for the Release, and that by signing the Release he was
releasing Dr. Beck and the Hospital from liability.

(Andreini

Deposition, pp. 50, 56-58? R. at 118, 130, 134-136).
17.

After the Hospital provided their part of the agreement,

free services for the decompression surgery, plaintiff breached his
part of the contract by pursuing legal action against the Hospital.
(Andreini Deposition, p. 64; R. at 118, 138).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I
The trial court's Order granting summary judgment in favor of
defendant Holy Cross Hospital was proper and should be affirmed
because the Release from Liability and Release of All Claims
("Release") signed

by plaintiff was a valid

contract barring plaintiff's claims.
and signed the Release.

and enforceable

Plaintiff read, understood

Plaintiff also admits that he could have

got up and left the Hospital rather than have the surgery; and that
he could have gone home and tried to find another doctor and
another hospital to perform the surgery.

-5-

A release can be avoided only if the evidence of invalidity
is clear and convincing. To invalidate a contract, a party thereto
must show (1) that the other contracting party committed a wrongful
act (2) which put the initial party in fear (3) such as to compel
him to act against his will.

There is absolutely no evidence in

the record that the Hospital committed a wrongful act which put
plaintiff in fear and compelled him to act against his will.

To

constitute legal duress, plaintiff must have acted against his
will, and have had no other viable alternative.

In this instance,

there is no evidence that plaintiff was under duress when he signed
the Release. Plaintifffs own deposition testimony establishes that
not only did he not act against his will but that he also had other
viable alternatives; leaving the hospital and finding another
doctor and hospital.
The law favors the good faith settlement of claims and the
policy of this Court favors agreements such as this Release in
resolving disputes.

The trial court's decision that, as a matter

of law, the Release was not signed under duress and is a valid and
enforceable agreement barring plaintiff's claims was appropriate.
POINT II
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
plaintiff's Motion to Amend his Complaint. Whether to grant leave
to amend is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Absent
a clear abuse of that discretion, the appellate court will not
-6-

disturb a trial court's ruling on a motion to amend.

There is no

evidence in the record that the trial court abused its discretion
in this instance. Although the basis for the trial court's denial
of appellant's Motion to Amend is unclear, courts may exercise
their discretion and deny leave to amend where there is no evidence
in the record supporting the new theory sought to be added by the
plaintiff.

Since there is absolutely no evidence of fraud in this

case, it was clearly within the trial court's discretion to deny
plaintiff leave to amend. Allowing plaintiff to add a claim based
on such a theory would have served no purpose.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT HOLY CROSS
HOSPITAL WAS PROPER AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
BECAUSE THE RELEASE FROM LIABILITY AND RELEASE
OF ALL CLAIMS SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF WAS A VALID
AND ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT BARRING PLAINTIFF'S
CLAIMS.
The sole issue for review on appeal is the correctness of the
trial court's finding that the Release from Liability and Release
of All Claims signed by plaintiff was a valid and enforceable
contract.

In reaching their decision, the trial court entered the

following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (See R

at 315-

318):
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.
That on or about May 5, 1987 R. David Beck,
M.D., an orthopedic surgeon operated on the right knee
-7-

of the plaintiff. In this operation, which was performed
at Holy Cross Hospital, Dr. Bruce Hultgren acted as
anesthesiologist.
2.
In the days following the surgery on plaintiff's knee plaintiff noticed a tingling sensation in his
fingers.
3.
Following plaintiff's discharge from Holy Cross
Hospital, the plaintiff was diagnosed as having a
compression paralysis.
4.
That subsequent to Dr. Nord's diagnosis, Dr.
Beck recommended surgery which was scheduled for July 9,
1987.
5.
That shortly prior to the surgery the plaintiff
was presented with a release by Clara Bates, an employee
of Holy Cross Hospital.
6.
That plaintiff told Clara Bates that he would
not sign the release.
7.

That Dr. Beck then spoke with the plaintiff.

8*. At that point in time, there was no reason why
plaintiff could not have left the hospital in the company
of his mother and Sarah McCarthy who had brought him to
the hospital.
9.
That prior to signing the release plaintiff
discussed the release with his mother and Sarah McCarthy.
10. That plaintiff signed the release, the language
of which is as follows:
"I, EUGENE R. ANDREINI, will receive surgery
to correct ulnar nerve palsy at approximately
10:00 a.m., July 9, 1987, with Holy Cross
Hospital of Salt Lake City, Utah and David
Beck, M.D., bearing all costs for this
procedure as payment of service.
I recognize this arrangement, made to me, as
total compensation for the alleged accidental
incident occurring during total knee joint
replacement on May 5, 1987, does not constitute an acknowledgement of responsibility
by Holy Cross Hospital of Salt Lake City for
-8-

said accidental incident, and do hereby
release, acquit, and forswear any claim, by me
or on my behalf, against Holy Cross Hospital
of Salt Lake City, and David Beck, M.D. for
liability and damages which have occurred or
may occur arising from said accidental
incident."
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
That the plaintiff at the time he signed the
Release was not on any medication nor was he in a lifethreatening situation.
2.
That valid consideration was given by Holy
Cross Hospital and Dr. Beck for the release and that this
consideration was the free surgical procedure offered by
Dr. Beck and the free hospital care offered by Holy Cross
Hospital which was accepted by plaintiff.
3.
That at the time of the signing of the release
the plaintiff was not operating under any duress,
collusion, intimidation or undue influence by either
Dr. Beck or personnel at the Holy Cross Hospital.
4.
That the plaintiff at the time of signing the
release had reasonable alternatives and elected not to
take them.
5.
That the release executed by the plaintiff on
July 9, 1987 released any of plaintiff's claims that he
may have then had or thereafter had against Dr. Beck,
the Holy Cross Hospital and its personnel.
Thus, the trial court's conclusions that plaintiff was not on
medication nor in a life threatening situation at the time he
signed the Release; that valid consideration was given for the
Release; that plaintiff was not operating

under any duress,

collusion, intimidation or undi le Influence by either Dr. Beck or
personnel at Holy Cross Hospital; that plaintiff had reasonable
alternatives at the time of the signing of the Release and elected
-9-

not to take them; and, that the Release executed by plaintiff on
July 9, 1987 released any of plaintiff's claims that he had against
Dr. Beck and Holy Cross Hospital, must be reviewed for correctness.
Plaintiff's primary challenge to the trial court's decision,
and to the validity of the Release, is based on the grounds that
it was signed under duress.

It is unclear from plaintiff's brief

exactly what acts were committed by personnel from the Hospital
which constituted duress.

However, it is clear from the above

findings that the trial court considered this issue and found that
there was no duress, collusion, intimidation or undue influence by
hospital personnel.
In Ulibarri v. Christenson, 2 Utah 2d 367, 275 P.2d 170 (Utah
1954), the Utah Supreme Court established the burden of proof
required to invalidate a release:
. . . A release can be avoided only if the evidence of
invalidity is clear and convincing, or, as has sometimes
be said by this court, clear, unequivocal and convincing.
(Citations omitted).
Id. at 171.
Thus, the trial court found in this instance that there was not
clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence of duress, collusion,
intimidation or undue influence on the part of hospital personnel.
When reviewing plaintiff's own deposition, it is clear why
the trial court reached the conclusion it did that plaintiff was
not operating under duress at the time of the signing of the
Release.

(Pertinent excerpts of the Deposition of Eugene Andreini,
-10-

attached as Exhibit 1, R

at 129-138).

Plaintiff admitted in his

deposition that he read and understood f he Release, and signed it
in the presence of his mother and a friend.
pp. 5 0 , 5 2 , 5 4 , 56-58; R. at 129-138).

(Andreini Deposition,

Plaintiff also admitted

that he was not on medicati oi i wl ien. 1 le read the Release, that he
discussed signing the Release with his mother and a friend, and
that he could have gotten up and left the hospital rather than have
the surgery.
133, 136-137).

(Andreini Deposition, pp. 52-54, 58-59; R. at 131Plaintiff went on to further admit that he could

have gone home and attempted to find another doctor
hospital

to perform the surgery.

59; R. at 136-137).

and

another

(Andre,ni Deposition, pp. 58-

Finally, plaintiff admits that he knew what

was in the Release, realized that t he Hospital was going to waive
their charges in return for the Release, and that by signing the
Release he was releasing Dr. Beck and the Hospital from liability.
(Andreini Deposition, pp. 50, 56-58; R. at 130, 134-136).

Based

on plaintiff's own testimony, the trial court correctly found that
there was not clear and convincing

evidence

of duress

and

that

plaintiff had other viable alternatives of which he was aware.
This Court addressed

a similar fact situation

Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751 (Utah 19 8 2 ) .

in Horqan v.
In Horqan, the

court addressed the validity of a release of claims contract where
the only challenge to the release was a claim of duress.
Horqan involved a situation where a former employee brought
an action against his former employer seeking to recover additional
-11-

compensation

following his termination.

At the time of his

termination, the employee was given a compensation package.

Both

parties then signed a mutual release waiving all claims against the
other and releasing each other from all obligations and liabilities
arising out of the employment relationship. The defendants raised
the mutual release as a defense and plaintiff responded that the
release was unenforceable because he had signed it under duress and
coercion.

Defendants moved for summary judgment based on the

release and the trial court granted defendants' motion.
On appeal, this Court addressed the definition of a release
and the court's policy towards this form of contract:
A release is a type of contract and may generally be
enforced or rescinded on the same grounds as other contracts. The law favors the amicable, good faith settlement of claims, and the encouragement and preservation
of such settlements 'constitute strong arguments for
enforcing releases.' Generally, 'where an affirmative
defense is stated, such as a valid release, which would
defeat the cause of action, it is the duty of the court
to grant a judgment based thereon.' (Citations omitted).
Id. at 753.
In

further

reviewing

the

facts, the

court

agreed

with

plaintiff's assertion that there were genuine issues of fact, but
held the following:
. . . The mere existence of genuine issues of fact in
the case as a whole does not preclude the entry of
summary judgment if those issues are immaterial to
resolution of the case. (Citation omitted).
Id. at 752.
The court went on to add:
-12-

The only material facts at this point concern the signing
and terms of the mutual release; for if the release is
valid and enforceable, plaintiff is precluded by its
terms from asserting further claims against defendant.
The only questions before us, then, are (1) whether there
is a genuine issue concerning the signing or terms of the
mutual release; and if not, (2) whether that release
entitles defendants to a judgment as a matter of law.
(Citations omitted).
Id. at 752.
After a brief review of the record, the court determined that
the facts surrounding the signing and terms of the release were
undisputed.

The only remaining issue for them to address was the

question whether plaintiff signed the release under duress.

The

question of what facts are sufficient to constitute duress was held
by the court to be a question of law.

Id. at 753.

Citing Fox v. Piercey, 119 Utah 367, 227 P.2d 763, 766 (Utah
1951), the court defined duress as follows:
". . . Any wrongful act or threat which actually puts
the victim in such fear as to compel him to act against
his will."
Id. at 753.
Thus, to invalidate a contract based on duress, a party
thereto must show (1) that the other contracting party committed
a wrongful act (2) which put the initial party in fear (3) such as
to compel him to act against his will.

Heqlar Ranch, Inc. v.

Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980).

Thus, even if there

were a wrongful act by the hospital in this instance, which there
wasn't, and it put plaintiff in fear, which his own deposition
testimony refutes, it must have also compelled him to act against
-13-

his will.

There was no evidence presented to the trial court, or

in plaintiff's brief, that plaintiff acted against his will when
he signed the Release.
The court in Horqan held that plaintiff did not sign the
release under duress and the release was valid and enforceable.
Thus, the plaintiff's suit was barred by the release and the trial
court's entry of summary judgment for defendants was affirmed.
In this instance, plaintiff admits reading, signing, and
understanding the release.
138).

(See Andreini Deposition, R. at 129-

Thus, the only issue to be resolved is whether he did so

under duress.

The question then faced by the trial court was

whether the Hospital committed a wrongful act which put plaintiff
in fear such as to compel or coerce him to act against his will.
Horqan, 657 P.2d at 753.

There is absolutely no evidence in the

record establishing these elements.

To constitute legal duress,

plaintiff must have acted against his will, and have had no other
viable alternative.

Id. at 754.

This scenario was wholly

unsupported by the facts in evidence before the trial court.

As

previously stated, plaintiff admitted that could have got up and
left the hospital

rather then have the surgery.

Deposition, pp. 53-54; R. at 132-133).

(Andreini

Plaintiff also admitted

that he could have gone home and tried to find another doctor and
another hospital to perform the surgery. (Andreini Deposition, pp.
58-59; R. at 136-137).

Thus, plaintiff had other viable alterna-

tives and was admittedly not acting against his will.
-14-

Plaintiff argues in his brief that there was doubt in the
trial court as to the question of duress, which should have been
resolved in his favor. However, although there may have been doubt
in plaintiff's mind, it Is clear from the trial court's findings
that there was no doubt in the courts mind as to the question of
duress.

The question of what facts are sufficient to constitute

duress is a question of law. Horgan, 657 P.2d at 753. Since there
was no doubt as to this issue, the court did not have to reach the
question of resolving the issue in favor ui plaintiff and found as
a matter of law that there was no duress.
Plaintiff also argues in his brief that he was induced i i 1 to
executing the Release uncle i i)i

Beck's threat of "no surgery," and

that a threat of this nature constitutes a showing of duress sufficient to invalidate the Release.

Since 1 he Hospital was merely

provide IK) hospital services and personnel to assist with the
surgery, it is difficult to see how this claim can be made against
the Hospital.

However, it is not even necessary to reach this

because appellant's plain deposition testimony refutes this allegation. Appellant admitted that he could have gone home and found
another hospital

and another doctor

to perform

the surgery.

(Andreini Deposition, pp. 58-59; R. at 136-137). Further, the Utah
Supreme Court has held that emotional distress is not the equivalent of duress and is inadequate to invalidate a release. Horgan,
657 P.2d at 753, citing Ulibarri v. Christenson, 275 P.2d at 172.

-15-

Plaintiff relies in his brief on the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts §§ 175 and 176, to support his argument that he signed
the release under duress.

He alleges that § 175 was violated

because the hospital made a threat which breached a duty of good
faith and fair dealing. Not only is this assertion unsupported by
any facts, but it applies to a situation where there is a contract
in place. Since plaintiff argues that the threat took place prior
to his signing of the release, and therefore prior to any contractual relationship, this section would not apply even it there were
facts supporting it.
Plaintiff also relies on §§ 175 and 176 in support of the
argument that he had no reasonable alternative but to sign the
release.

However, plaintiff admits in his deposition that he did

have the alternative of leaving the hospital, and the trial court
clearly found as a matter of law that plaintiff had reasonable
alternatives and elected not to take them.

(Andreini deposition,

pp. 53-54; R. at 132-133).
Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in
weighing the credibility of a conflicting affidavit and deposition
testimony. Although plaintiff does not specify whose affidavit and
deposition he is referring to, the hospital will assume he is
referring to his own.

Yet, it is not clear to the Hospital that

plaintiff's affidavit does contradict his deposition testimony.
Even if it did, however, it would have no effect on the trial
court's ruling.

The general rule in Utah is that an affiant may
-16-

not "raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit which contradicts
his deposition, unless he can provide an explanation of the
discrepancy."

Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130, 1140 (Utah App. 1990)

(citation omitted).
At the end of this Court's opinion in Horgan, the following
observation was made which appears particularly relevant in this
instance:
. . . It is well settled that the mere fact of an
improvident or bad bargain or a feeling of latent
discontent is not a sufficient basis to avoid the effect
of an otherwise va3id release. (Citations Omitted).
Id. at 754.
This Court also espoused

sentiment for enforcing

contracts such as the Release involved in this situation in Lindon
City v. Engineers Construction Co., 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah 19811.
Although Lindon involved a dispute of the enforcement of an
arbitration agreement, the Court's logic would appear to apply to
the present situation as well.

The Court stated the following:

There appears to be no 'public policy1 or other good
reason why persons effectively and by contract, should
not be able to agree to an out of court settlement. It
is accomplished frequently by stipulation, binding
concessions, accord and satisfaction, covenant not to
sue, by indemnity contract, and by other honorable and
legal means.
The trend toward such inter se agreements without resort
to litigation, reflects a good, practical way to resolve
disputes.
Id. at 1073.

-17-

The Release signed in this instance was intended to achieve the
same result.
It is appellant's burden factually to establish a prima facie
showing for each element of his claim.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322-27 (1986); Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care,
Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah App. 1987).

There is absolutely no

evidence that plaintiff signed the Release against his will.
Plaintiff has also failed to demonstrate how the Hospital's conduct
was wrongful or put him in fear.

After reviewing the evidence in

this case, the trial court found as a matter of law (1) that the
Release signed was valid and enforceable and, (2) that plaintiff
did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that he signed
the Release under duress.

Based on the evidence presented, the

trial court's granting of summary judgment was appropriate and
should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AMEND
COMPLAINT.
On November 12, 1990, plaintiff filed a motion in the trial
court to amend his Complaint.

In essence, plaintiff sought to add

a claim that Dr. Beck and Holy Cross Hospital misrepresented facts
to him in order to induce him to sign the aforementioned Release

-18-

of Claims.1

(R. at 215-217).

This motion was heard by the trial

court on February 1, 1991, and denied in its March 4, 1991 Order.
(R. at 313-314) .
Whether to grant leave to amend is within the sound discretion
of the trial court.

Westlev v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 663

P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983).

Absent a clear abuse of that discretion,

the appellate court will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a
motion to amend.

Kelly v. Utah Power & Light, 746 P.2d 1189, 1190

(Utah App. 1987).

Plaintiff's brief sets forth absolutely no

evidence that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
Motion to Amend.

Instead, plaintiff merely alleges some of the

factors a trial court must consider when addressing a motion to
amend.

Although appellant is correct in his assertion that

prejudice to the defendant is an important factor to consider when
addressing a motion to amend, it is only one of several considerations to be taken into account by the trial judge.
The elements necessary to establish a claim of fraud are (1)
a false representation of an existing material fact, (2) made
knowingly or recklessly

for the purpose of inducing reliance

thereon, (3) upon which the plaintiff reasonably relies to his
detriment.

Atkinson v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 798 P.2d 733, 737

1

In his Motion to Amend Complaint, plaintiff failed to allege
facts establishing how Holy Cross Hospital took part in this
alleged fraud. Despite the fact that this proposed amendment does
not state a claim against Holy Cross Hospital, the hospital will
respond above to the merits of plaintiff's argument.
-19-

(Utah 1990).
appellant's

The trial court's March 4, 1991 Order denying
Motion

to Amend

Complaint

does

not

specify

the

reasoning behind the court's decision. (The court does refer to the
fact that it had already granted summary judgment in favor of all
defendants).

(R. at 313-314). However, courts may exercise their

discretion and deny leave to amend where the evidence does not
support the plaintiff's claims.

Since there is absolutely no

evidence of fraud in this instance, it was within the trial court's
discretion to deny plaintiff leave to amend.
In Trimble v. Coleman Co., 437 P.2d 219, 227 (Kan. 1968), the
trial court denied plaintiff's motion to amend the pleadings to
include the theories of res ipsa loquitur and breach of implied
warranty of fitness.

Trimble involved a negligence action for

deaths due to carbon monoxide poisoning against the seller and
manufacturer of a gas heating stove. On appeal, the Kansas Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's decision denying leave to amend
and stated "we do not believe that either of these doctrines was
applicable to the facts in evidence in this case." With regard to
the claim for breach of implied warranty of fitness, the court's
decision to affirm the trial court's daniel of leave to amend was
based on the fact that the plaintiff could not show evidence for
one of the elements of the claim; that the product was defective
as of the time it left the possession and control of the parties
sought to be held liable.

Id.

at 227.

-20-

The Arizona Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in
Ornelas v. Fry, 727 P.2d 819 (Ariz. App. 1986).

Ornelas involved

a medical malpractice claim against an anesthesiologist for damages
incurred in a failed kidney transplant operation.

The plaintiff

moved to amend the complaint in order to present a new claim of
negligence or theory of recovery based on the doctor's alleged
alcoholism.

The trial court denied the motion, holding that no

evidence of the doctor's general "alcoholism" would be admitted
without a factor predicate from a witness that the doctor's
abilities in the operation room at the time of the operation were
some way affected.

Id.

at 822.

The Arizona Court of Appeals

affirmed the trial court's decision to deny the motion to amend.
Its ruling was based on plaintiff's inability to furnish any
evidence that at the time of the alleged malpractice the doctor's
performance was in any way impaired because of the use of alcohol.
As mentioned, the basis for the trial court's denial of
appellant's Motion to Amend is unclear in this instance. However,
the above cases illustrate the discretion of trial courts to deny
a motion to amend when there is no evidence in the record supporting the new theory sought to be added by the plaintiff.

It was

within the trial court's discretion to recognize that granting
appellant's Motion to Amend would serve no purpose but to increase
time and expense since the fraud claim could not be established as
a matter of law. See also Dupler v. Yates, 351 P.2d 624, 637 (Utah
1960) (wherein the Utah Supreme Court found that the trial court
-21-

did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to amend where
nothing new or of substance was contained in the proposed amendment.)

Regardless of the trial court's reasoning behind their

decision to deny leave to amend, there is no evidence that the
court abused its discretion.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments and authorities, the trial
court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of defendant
Holy Cross Hospital, and its decision denying plaintiff's Motion
to Amend Complaint, should be affirmed.
The trial court's decision that the Release of Claims and
Release from Liability signed by plaintiff was not signed under
duress, and was a valid and enforceable agreement which barred
plaintiff's claims against the Hospital, was appropriate and should
be affirmed.
Further, the trial court's decision to deny plaintiff's Motion
to Amend was within its sound discretion and was not an abuse of
that discretion.
DATED this

f^j

day of September, 1991.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

David W. Slagle """ r J
Attorneys for Appellee
Holy Cross Hospital
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thing like this, you know, where it looked like it might
be somebody's fault. And he said that he would talk to
the hospital for me. And so —

and I hadn 't talked to

him since, so I didn't know.
So you discussed with Dr. Beck that the hospital

Q.

might waive its fee?
A.

Yes.

He was going to talk to the hospital in my

behalf.
This lady that you talked to at McKay-Dee, who

Q.
was she?
A.
mine.

She was just an acquaintance of a friend of
I don't even know her name.

Q.

Who was the friend that knows her"p

A.

His name is Ted.

Q.

Who was that?

A.

I could find out, I guess.

Q.

Okay.

A.

If it's important.

Q.

This nurse at McKay-Dee said that quite possibly

What's his last name?

the hospital might waive its fee?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And then you called Dr. Beck and )oroached that

subject with him?
A.

Right.

Q.

He said he'd talk to the hospital about it?
50

I

A.

No.

2

[Deposition Exhibit 1 marked

3

for identification.]

4

5

Q.

(By Mr. Fishier)

marked as Exhibit 1.

I'll show you what's been

Can you identify that document?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

And what is it?

8

A.

It's the release that I signed the morning of

9

10
11

the surgery.
Q.

Mentions here that this surgery was to commence

at approximately 10:00 a.m.; is that correct?

12

A.

I'm not sure.

13

Q.

About what time did you sign the release?

14

A.

Probably a half-hour, 4 5 minutes, maybe, before

15
16
17
18
19

the surgery.
Q.

Possibly an hour.

When this lady brought the release in, were you

alone in the room?
A.

No.

My mother was there and Sarah McCarthy, and

the two nurses.

20

Q.

Did you read the release?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

At that point in time, had you received any

23

medicat ion?

24

A.

I'm not sure.

25

Q.

Did you discuss this release with your mother
52

1

and Sarah?

2

A.

I told —

Clara Bates, I guess is who she w a s ,

3

now that I see her name on there —

that I wasn't going

4

to sign it.

5

Q.

And what did Dr. Beck say?

6

A.

He told me that if I wanted to have the surgery,

So she got Dr. Beck on the phone.

7

I had to sign the release; and if I didn't sign the

8

release, he was going to play hardball with m e .

9

were his exact words.

Those

10

Q.

What did you take that to mean?

11

A.

That he was just going to let me figure out how

22
IS
14

to take care of my hands myself, I guess.
Q.

You knew there were other orthopedists in the

city, didn't you?

15

A.

I guess so.

16

Q-

Okay.

Is there any reason why you couldn't have

11

just gotten up out of the bed, put your clothes back on

lg

and walked out?

19

A.

Other than the fact that I was extremely upset

20

and just had the surgery two months before and I was on

2i

crutches and upset and my hands had deteriorated 'til I

22

looked like a skeleton.

23

Q.

That's not —

listen to my question.

Had you

24

wanted to at the time, you could have asked your mother

25

and Sarah to take you from the hospital room and you

1

could have left the hospital?

2

A*

Probably so.

3

Q.

Who took you to the hospital?

4

A,

My mother and Sarah.

5

Q.

And they were still there?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q*

Did anyone else hear what was said on the

8

telephone by Dr. Beck?

9
10

A.
end.

I don't believe so.

They couldn't hear on my

They just knew how upset I was.

U

Q.

Did you tell them what Beck said?

12

A.

Yeah.

13

Q.

So rather than have Sarah and your mother take

14

you back when she would come, you decided to sign the

15

release?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

Did you discuss signing the release with your

18

mother or Sarah?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Tell me what you said to them and they said to

A.

I said according to Dr. Beck's conversation with

21
22

you.

23

me on the phone right before we made the appointment, you

24

know, two or three days before, he indicated to me that

25

in most cases after two or three weeks after the
54

operation I would gain 50 percent of my feeling or
mobility —

or whatever you want to call it —

back in my

hands, and probably the other 50 percent within two to
three months. So I was under the impression that the
surgery would correct it, and that's why I wanted the
surgery done as soon as possibledragged on for quite a while-

It looked like it had

Anyway, you know, my hands

had deteriorated to that point.

It had been two months

and there hadn't been anything done except looking at
them.
Q.

At the time you went into the hospital on the

morning of July 9th, 1987, did you feel that there was
anyone at fault for the problems with your arms?
A.

Yes, but I didn't know who.

Q.

You felt that somebody had done something wrong?

A.

Sure.

I .indicated that to Dr. Beck in that

conversation that I had with him, too.
words to him were:
happy."

I think my — my

"If the surgery comes out okay, I'm

I told him, I says, "I don't want no cheese. I

just want out of the trap."

I told him:

"If I have

permanent damage, that's another case — " and I think
that's probably what maybe put him on guard that he
better stick his name on the release, too.
Q.

So as I understand it, your feeling was, is that

you wanted the surgery; and if the surgery was
55

successful, the July surgery was successful, you weren't
going to make any claim against anyone; is that correct?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

You understood that the hospital would waive its

fee or its charges.

Did you expect to give anything to

the hospital in exchange for that?
A.
or not.
Q.

I didn't know whether they were going to do it
He said he would mention it.
Did Clara Bates, or whomever brought that

release up —

did she tell you that the hospital would

waive its fee?
A.

It says in the —

in the paper that she gave me.

Q.

But she also told you that?

A.

I don't know.

Q.

And so as you understood it —

I guess.
as you're in the

room and after she brought the release up, you understood
that you would sign the release and the hospital would
waive its fee or charges, and Dr. Beck would allow you to
make payments for his charges, as he said, chip away at
them?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you understood that that was the position of

the hospital and the position of Dr. Beck?
A.

I didn't know prior to this release that the

hospital was going to demand a release.

1

Q.

Okay.

But I want to talk about that window of

2

time when the release is in the room with you, Clara

3

Bates, your mother and Sarah McCarthy.

4

time that Beck was going —

5

perform the operation, but allow you to make payments on

6

his fee and the hospital would waive its fee if you would

You knew at the

what he was going to do was

7 J sign the release?
8

9

A.

I guess that's what it says here.

this again.

10

Let me read

(pause.)

I guess the part that upset me more than

11

anything was he had included himself after we had made a

12

deal, or he would do the surgery and I would make

13

payments.

14

Q.

Okay.

But you understood before you signed the

15

release what everyone's position was; you understood what

16

the hospital wanted, the hospital wanted a release and

17

they would waive their fee; you knew that?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

You knew that Dr. Beck would do the surgery and

20

allow you to make payments for his fee?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

And you knew to get both of these commitments,

23

one from the hospital and another commitment from Dr.

24

Beck, that you had to sign the release?

25

A.

I knew that I had to sign the release to get the
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1

surgery done.

That was my prime concern.

2

Q.

By Dr. Beck?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

On that day?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

So you selected —

knowing Dr. Beck's position

7

and knowing the hospital's position, your choice was to

8

sign the release and have the surgery done on those

9

conditions on that day?

10

A.

(Pause.)

u\

Q.

Yes?

12

A.

That's a question?

13

Q.

Yes.

14 \

A.

I knew that if I signed it, they would do the

15
16
17

surgery.
Q.

You knew that if you signed the release, you

were releasing Dr. Beck and the hospital?

18

A.

I guess I did.

19

Q.

Well, you new that, didn't you?

20

A.

Yes. I didn't like it, didn't want to; but they

21
22

had me in a trap and I had to do it.
Q.

And this trap that you're talking about is, is

23

that you were kind of in your life at a fork in the road

24

and you had two choices that you could have made: You

25

could have had your mother and Sarah McCarthy take you
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1

out of the room, go back down to the vehicle in which you

2

came to the hospital and go back to your home and find

3

another hospital and find another doctor; that was a

4

choice that was open to you?

5

A.

I guess so,

6

Q.

And the other choice to you was to sign the

7

release and then go forward with the surgery, with the

8

understanding that the hospital would waive its fee, Dr.

9

Beck would allow you to make payments on the fee in

JO

exchange for the release; is that right?

u \

A-

You lost me on Dr. Beck's.

12

Q.

Dr. Beck would do the surgery and allow you to

13

make payments on the fee?

14

15

A.

this showed up.

16
1

7

That was the agreement I had with him before

Q.

And after this showed up —

Exhibit 1 —

referring to

you entered into a new agreement with him

18

whereby you would have the surgery done by Dr. Beck, you

19

would release Dr. Beck and Dr. Beck would allow you to

20

make payments on this surgical fee; is that correct?

21

A.

You're losing me on the surgical-fee part.

22

Q.

He was going to let you make payments?

23 \

A.

You mean —

24

do.

25

you're saying?

it sounds like something he would

He wants the release and the money; is that what
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1

Q.

Did there come a time which you felt you wanted

2

to bring a lawsuit against either the hospital or Dr.

3

Beck or Dr. Hultgren?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

When did you decide that you thought you should

6

sue any one of the three I just mentioned?

7 I

A.

After I had gave them enough time for the —

8

percentages of the recoveries that Dr. Beck led me to

9

believe would happen if I had the surgery, like 50

10

percent in two-three weeks and possibly the other 50

•II-

percent within two-three months,

I mean, I even gave it

12

to —

13

nerves regenerated one millimeter a day and were looking

14

at possibly 18 inches.

15

half, so I waited like damn near until the last minute to

16

give it as much time as I could.

17
IS

beyond that.

the

Q.

Dr. Nord told me that they —

that

So he said maybe a year and a

Did you ever tell Dr. Nord after the surgery

anything about the release?

19

A.

No.

20

Q.

Did you discuss the release at all with Dr.

21
22

Beck again, or did you just discuss your condition?
A.

No.

We never —

never anything —

he was just

23

kind of cool and distant toward m e , and I was kind of

24

cool and distant toward him.

25

Q.

What's your condition presently?
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Tab 2

RELEASE FROM LIABILITY
AND
RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS

I, EUGENE R. ANDKEINI, will receive surgery to correct ulnar nerve
palsy at approximately 10:00 a.m., July 9, 1987, with Holy Cross Hospital
of Salt Lake City, Utah and David Beck, M.D., bearing all costs for this
procedure as payment of services.
I recognize this arrangement, made to me, as total compensation for
the alleged accidental incident occurring during total knee joint
replacement on May 5, 1987, does not constitute an acknowledgment of
responsibility by Holy Cross Hospital of Salt Lake City for said
accidental incident, and do hereby release, acquit, and forswear any
claim, by me or on my behalf, against Holy Cross Hospital of Salt Lake
City, and David Beck, M.D. for liability and damages which have occurred
or may occur arising from said accidental incident.

Signature:

l^L^
\[ { A
EUGpNETt. ANDREINI

.

Date:

^

r, 11*7

Witness

